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PENAL DEFERENCE AND  
OTHER ODDITIES IN  
UNITED STATES V. COMSTOCK 
GARRICK B. PURSLEY* 
As the highest Court in the land, the Supreme Court of the United 
States enjoys a certain degree of freedom to meander around on the 
way to its conclusions. The Court’s recent decision in United States v. 
Comstock1 is a good example; the Comstock opinion is notable as 
much for its reasoning as for its principal holding. Section 4248 of the 
federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act2 authorizes the 
Attorney General to civilly commit federal prisoners adjudged 
“sexually dangerous.”3 In a seven-two decision, the Court rejected 
enumerated powers and federalism-based constitutional objections, 
and held that the commitment provision was a permissible exercise of 
Congress’s authority under the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper 
Clause.4 The Court defanged the recurring argument “that, when 
legislating pursuant to the [Clause], Congress’[s] authority can be no 
more than one step removed from a specifically enumerated power”5 
and held, instead, that the Clause confers implied powers that aid the 
effective exercise of other implied powers.6 Section 4248 was 
permissible, the Court concluded, because it was a reasonable way to 
augment the federal prison system. The federal prison system is a tool 
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 1. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
 2. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248 (West 2010)). 
 3. Id. at 620–21. 
 4. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965. The Necessary and Proper Clause is U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 18 (conferring on Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States”). 
 5. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963 (rejecting the argument as “irreconcilable with our 
precedents”). 
 6. Id. at 1962–63. 
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for effectively criminalizing violations of federal law, which in turn 
ensures that Congress can effectively exercise its enumerated powers.7 
The Court’s analytical path to that conclusion, however, has several 
interesting detours; those detours are the subject of this brief essay. 
Comstock’s analytic oddities may have implications in contexts other 
than federal penal regulation. I offer a smattering of previews. 
First, the opinion’s argumentative structure is noteworthy in itself: 
The Comstock Court upheld section 4248 not on the basis of one or 
several independently sufficient reasons, but rather in the light of 
“five considerations, taken together.”8 In this sense, the opinion 
evokes Marbury v. Madison9 more strongly than its direct analytic 
ancestor, McCulloch v. Maryland.10 McCulloch is the seminal case 
considering the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause,11 and thus 
is the more substantively relevant of the two for the central issue in 
Comstock.12 But Marbury provides the closer analog to the structure 
of the Comstock Court’s reasoning. Marbury famously (or 
notoriously) contains a hodge-podge of arguments that support 
judicial power to review political branch actions for 
constitutionality—arguments that are often characterized as 
individually insufficient to establish the permissibility of the practice 
but sufficient when taken in the aggregate.13 The distinguished 
pedigree of the Comstock majority’s argumentative strategy, however, 
did not deter Justice Thomas from characterizing it as having 
“perfunctorily genuflect[ed] to McCulloch’s framework for assessing 
Congress’[s] Necessary and Proper Clause authority” before 
“promptly abandon[ing] [it] in favor of a novel five-factor test 
supporting its conclusion that section 4248 is a ‘necessary and proper’ 
 
 7. See id. at 1963–64. 
 8. Id. at 1956. 
 9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (relying on five justifications for 
judicial review). 
 10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (addressing the scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause). See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (discussing McCulloch). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 12. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414–21 (discussing the grant of power to 
Congress in the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 13. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. 
TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39–40 (6th ed. 2009) (describing five 
arguments for judicial supremacy in Marbury; noting that “[p]erhaps these various arguments 
appear more forceful in combination than they appear when separated[,]” such that “while none 
is independently decisive, the various arguments together suggest that judicial review is part of 
the constitutional structure”). 
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adjunct to a jumble of unenumerated ‘authorit[ies]’.”14 One obvious 
problem with “the Marbury strategy” is the absence of a clear 
explanation of how multiple insufficient reasons add up to a sufficient 
reason to suppose an action is constitutional. Nevertheless, the 
decision to uphold section 4248 drew seven of the nine votes on the 
Court, and the Marbury-style case for the provision’s permissibility 
attracted a five-Justice majority. Comstock demonstrates both the 
continuing validity of “the Marbury strategy”—the combination of 
several independently insufficient factors that, sometimes, suffice to 
establish constitutionality—and the Court’s continuing failure to 
explain how, exactly, that reasoning works. 
Although the majority portrayed its conclusion as a fairly 
mundane judicial sign-off on “a modest addition to a set of federal 
prison-related mental-health statutes that have existed for many 
decades[,]”15 there is a rather pressing open question about the central 
holding. On the one hand, the holding might be extremely permissive 
if read for the proposition that any action rationally related to the 
exercise of an implied congressional power necessarily satisfies the 
traditional Necessary and Proper Clause requirement that “the 
statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the 
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”16 The 
Court’s “novel five-factor test,”17 on this reading, would amount to a 
nonexclusive list of ways in which congressional actions may satisfy 
that requirement in virtue of their relationship to implied powers.18 
On the other hand, the five-factors might restrict the scope of the 
holding that actions may be justified by their relation to implied, 
rather than enumerated, congressional powers if read as a five-
pronged test, the failure of which to satisfy any element is grounds for 
 
 14. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1974 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (fourth alteration in 
original). 
 15. Id. at 1958. 
 16. Id. at 1956 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004); Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995); Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)). 
 17. Id. at 1974 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 18. For a post-decision discussion of possible broad and narrow readings of the Court’s 
holding in Comstock, see Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper 
Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 2009–2010 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 239, 248–
55 (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1684301 (last visited Oct. 5, 
2010). 
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invalidation.19 As Justice Thomas noted in dissent, “[t]he Court 
provides no answer” as to which of these readings is correct.20 This 
question about the meaning of the Court’s holding is an important 
one to which I return to later in this essay. 
This essay focuses principally on several curious side-issues in the 
Comstock Court’s reasoning, including the Court’s discussion of a 
counterintuitive instance of constitutional “dialogue” between 
Congress and the judiciary, its cryptic invocation of common law tort 
duties in analyzing the scope of congressional power, and its apparent 
deference to the executive’s interpretation of the statute under 
circumstances that typically would lead courts to reject deference. The 
essay offers brief, preliminary speculations about the Court’s reasons 
for making these odd analytic moves, their effects on the Comstock 
decision, and what their implications may be for this and other areas 
of law. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ODDITIES: DIALOGUES AND COMMON LAW 
One of Comstock’s oddities relates to the idea of constitutional 
“dialogue” between Congress and the judiciary.21 The history of 
federal civil commitment legislation highlights a somewhat 
counterintuitive instance of such a dialogue.22 Traditionally conceived, 
constitutional back-and-forth between courts and Congress has 
typecast players in predictable roles: Congress is the unprincipled 
policymaker that must be constrained and have its over-expansive 
programs invalidated; the judiciary is the rule-honoring, politically 
insulated supervisor that must do the constraining and the 
invalidating. With these roles in mind, one might expect such a 
 
 19. See Somin, supra note 18, at 244 (noting that if the “five factors” constitute a strict five-
pronged test for constitutionality, it “significantly undercuts the pro-government implications of 
the Court’s use of the rational basis test”). 
 20. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1975 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 21. For a sampling of the rich literature on constitutional dialogues, see generally DONALD 
MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1966) 
(expounding on constitutional dialogue); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: 
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988) (arguing that the dialogue between the three 
branches of government may yield consensus-based constitutional principles); ROBERT A. 
KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS (1997) (examining the relationship between the judiciary 
and Congress with respect to constitutional questions); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002) 
(discussing theories of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and judicial supremacy). 
 22. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1960 (recounting how Congress modified law on the civil 
commitment of mentally incompetent individuals with input from the judiciary). 
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dialogue to proceed with an overly ambitious Congress enacting 
statute A, followed by judicial invalidation of A on the basis of 
constitutional deficiency X, followed in turn by a congressional 
response modifying A to correct for X. Examples of this kind of 
deferential congressional role in constitutional dialogues include 
Congress’s responses to the Supreme Court’s decisions in United 
States v. Lopez23 and Buckley v. Valeo.24 In Lopez, the Court struck 
down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act as beyond the scope of 
the Commerce Clause because it did not contain language limiting its 
scope to matters relating to interstate commerce.25 And in Buckley, 
the Court invalidated provisions of the Federal Election Campaign 
Act on several grounds, including provisions structuring the Federal 
Elections Commission that violated separation-of-powers norms by 
subjecting an executive officer to congressional, rather than 
presidential, control.26 In the wake of each decision, Congress 
modified the statute to correct the constitutional infirmities identified 
by the Court. Those modified statutes remain on the books.27 
Another constitutional dialogue consistent with the conventional 
portrayal of the congressional and judicial characters might proceed 
as follows: A less deferential Congress enacts statute A, watches the 
Court invalidate A on constitutional ground X, and then responds by 
enacting an identical statute to challenge the Court’s conclusion that 
X is a legitimate constitutional basis for invalidating A. The saga of 
the legislative veto provides an example of this sort of assertive 
congressional role in a constitutional dialogue: In INS v. Chadha,28 the 
Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act that allowed a one-house vote to “veto” the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s deportation decisions.29 The 
 
 23. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
 24. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 25. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–62 (noting that the statute “contains no jurisdictional element 
which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question 
affects interstate commerce”). 
 26. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140. The Court also struck down several of the statute’s limitations 
on campaign contributions as First Amendment violations. See id. at 58–59. 
 27. See Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 657, 110 Stat. 3009-370–71 (1996) 
(amending the Gun Free School Zones Act); Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976) (amending the Federal Election Commission Act). 
See also J. Mitchell Pickerill, Congressional Responses to Judicial Review, CONGRESS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 151, 162–64 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds. 2005) (discussing these 
congressional responses). 
 28. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 29. Id. at 959. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/4/2010  11:54:31 AM 
2010] PENAL DEFERENCE AND OTHER ODDITIES 103 
Court concluded that the provision violated Article I’s requirement 
that legislative action be accomplished through bicameralism and 
presentment.30 The Court struck down the provision even though it 
was aware that hundreds more federal statutes contained similar 
provisions.31 In the wake of Chadha, Congress continued to use formal 
and informal legislative vetoes in a variety of policy contexts;32 and 
several times enacted provisions expressly stating its view that the 
legislative veto is a permissible exercise of congressional rulemaking 
powers.33 This sort of dialogic constitutional confrontation may not 
happen as frequently as commentators suppose34—Professor Pickerill 
demonstrates that dialogue between Congress and the judiciary on 
constitutional issues often involves congressional deference to judicial 
decisions.35 Still, Chadha and its aftermath show that contentious 
confrontations are possible.36 
The Comstock Court’s account of the development of federal civil 
commitment law, however, reveals a distinct dialogic progression: At 
the urging of the Judicial Conference’s committee on civil 
commitment, Congress enacted a narrowly-worded statute in 1949 
designed to commit mentally-ill federal prisoners after their release if 
no state would take responsibility for them and they were found to 
pose a danger to “the officers, the property, or other interests of the 
 
 30. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952–54. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7 (establishing the required 
procedure for exercising the “legislative power of the United States”). 
 31. See id. at 945 (noting that “[s]ince 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into 
law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes”) 
(quoting James Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive 
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REV. 323, 324 (1977)). 
 32. See generally Pickerill, supra note 27, at 152; Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: 
Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 288–91 (1993). Notably, Congress 
appeared to accept the Court’s conclusion for the first few years after Chadha, but later began 
enacting new legislative veto provisions at a steady clip. Fisher, supra, at 286–88. As Fisher 
notes, “[f]rom the date of the Court’s decision in Chadha to the end of the 102nd Congress on 
October 8, 1992, Congress enacted more than two hundred new legislative vetoes.” Id. at 288. 
 33. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (adding 
such a statement to an amended version of the Immigration and Nationality Act), as quoted and 
discussed in Pickerill, supra note 27, at 161 & n.19. 
 34. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); James Meernik and Joseph Ignagni, Judicial Review and 
Coordinate Construction of the Constitution, 1997 AM. J. POL. SCI. 447. 
 35. Pickerill, supra note 27, at 161 (arguing that “congressional responses [to judicial 
decisions] that amend or modify laws are usually more deferential to the Court’s constitutional 
interpretation”). 
 36. I have discussed and proposed further study of constitutional dialogue between 
Congress and the courts on preemption issues at length elsewhere. See generally Garrick B. 
Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511 (2010). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/4/2010  11:54:31 AM 
104 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE [VOL. 6:98 
United States.”37 In the courts, the language about “interests of the 
United States” was “uniformly interpreted . . . to mean that [the 
prisoner’s] ‘release would endanger the safety of persons, property or 
the public interest in general . . . ’.”38 Congress then broadened the 
statutory language “to conform more closely to the then-existing 
judicial interpretation.”39 This dialogic progression runs counter to the 
conventional characterizations deployed in describing “dialogic 
constitutionalism.” In the instance of constitutional dialogue 
described by the Comstock Court as having shaped federal civil 
commitment law, it seems that a too conservative Congress broadened 
the reach of its statutes in response to judicial signals that broader 
legislation was permitted by the Constitution. 
That this counterintuitive sort of dialogic progression influenced 
the amendment history of the very statutory scheme examined in 
Comstock—Congress’s enactment of the 1949 civil commitment 
statute in response to the urging of a committee of judges and 
subsequent expansion of the statute in reaction to the judicial 
approach to its application—may magnify the potential impact of the 
Court’s holding in Comstock itself. The Comstock Court’s new 
contribution to the dialogue between Congress and the courts over 
the allowable scope of the federal civil commitment regime appears 
to be judicial permission to predicate legislation on implied as well as 
enumerated powers. Congress, thus further emboldened by the 
Court’s affirmation, might push the envelope in this and other policy 
contexts until a limiting principle—on which the Comstock majority 
did not elaborate—is forcibly established. This sort of dialogue may 
be limited to the single instance the Comstock Court identifies—it 
might be an aberration. But if, instead, it is an example of a pattern 
that is repeated with some regularity, then additional analysis of the 
dynamic may advance both the already rich literature on 
constitutional dialogues and the nascent literature on sui generis 
constitutional deliberation in Congress and other legislatures.40 
 
 37. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1960 (2010) (quoting Law of Sept. 7, 1949, 
ch. 535, 63 Stat. 68 (1949)) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A § 4247 (West 2010)). 
 38. Id. (quoting United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1372, 1374 (4th Cir. 1969)). 
 39. Id. (noting that Congress “altered the language so as to authorize (explicitly) civil 
commitment if, in addition to the other conditions, the prisoner’s ‘release would create a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of 
another’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 4246(d) (West 2010)). 
 40. On constitutional dialogues generally, see the sources cited supra, note 21. For a partial 
bibliography of material on legislative constitutional interpretation, see Lee Epstein, Who Shall 
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A second peculiarity in Comstock is the Court’s cryptic invocation 
of the common law duty of custodians to “exercise reasonable care” 
to prevent those in their custody from inflicting “reasonably 
foreseeable ‘bodily harm to others’.”41 While it did not go so far as to 
hold that the need to discharge common law duties may authorize 
otherwise unconstitutional action, the Court did suggest that the 
existence of the duty illuminated, somehow, the scope of things 
“necessary and proper” for the federal government to do when acting 
in the role of custodian.42 The dissent sounded the intuitive rejoinder 
that “federal authority derives from the Constitution, not the common 
law.”43 But the Comstock majority did not rely on the common law 
duties of custodians as a basis for concluding that section 4248 is 
constitutionally permissible. This discussion of the common law, then, 
is odd in a sense because it seems almost entirely tangential to the 
Court’s conclusion. The existence of custodial duties at common law 
buttressed the Court’s argument that the federal government stands 
in a special relationship to its prisoners, but it was the special 
relationship, (which, presumably, would exist even if there were no 
common law duties) that mattered.44 But the majority seemed to view 
the existence of a common law duty as relevant to the question of 
congressional power—otherwise, why mention it at all? Assuming 
with the Court that there is some relevance between the two, the next 
question is how tort law is relevant to questions of constitutional 
power. 
Tort law relates to constitutional law in a variety of ways. John 
Goldberg provides evidence that the constitutional right to due 
process of law often has been construed to include the right to access 
a body of law that compensates individuals for private wrongs since 
the early eighteenth century.45 Tort law is connected to constitutional 
 
Interpret the Constitution?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1307–08, nn.4–10 (2006) (reviewing 
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 27). 
 41. See id. at 1961 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965)). 
 42. See id. (“If a federal prisoner is infected with a communicable disease that threatens 
others, surely it would be ‘necessary and proper’ for the Federal Government to take action, 
pursuant to its role as federal custodian, to refuse (at least until the threat diminishes) to release 
that individual among the general public, where he might infect others . . . . ”). 
 43. Id. at 1979 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 44. See id. at 1961 (observing that the special relationship of the federal government to its 
prisoners gives the government the unique opportunity to respond to public safety threats posed 
by releasing the prisoners and to respond to the problem of prisoners’ severed connections to 
any state resulting from federal incarceration). 
 45. John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right 
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 559–83 (2005). 
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law today in the familiar context of Bivens and section 1983 actions 
against government officials for violations of constitutional rights.46 
The underlying legal source for government liability in such actions is 
tort; thus, the government is bound in at least this sense by both tort 
and constitutional law. 47 To the extent that tort duties may be applied 
against the government to impose liability when they are violated, 
those duties may add to the case for ex ante governmental authority 
to avoid the liability their violation would impose, at least where there 
is an otherwise plausible constitutional basis for the action and no 
independent constitutional constraint. Thus, perhaps, the 
permissibility of government action at the margins of broad power-
conferring provisions like the Necessary and Proper Clause might be 
worked out in part by reference to tort duties. At the very least, the 
relationship between tort and constitutional law may be a bit more 
complex than the dissent would have it. 
II. PENAL DEFERENCE 
A third particularly curious aspect of the Comstock Court’s 
reasoning is its basis for rejecting federalism-based objections to 
section 4248. In choosing between two possible interpretations of the 
statute—one that presented federalism problems and one that did 
not—the Court appears to have deferred to the Solicitor General’s 
 
 46. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (permitting suits 
against federal officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity defenses); 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2010) (providing a cause of action against state government officials for 
constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity defenses); Lawrence Rosenthal, A 
Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 797, 815–18 (2007) (discussing bases for tort liabilities and immunities of the federal 
and state governments). 
 47. There is no reason in principle that government action could not be even more broadly 
constrained by both tort law and constitutional law. Common-law sovereign immunity doctrines 
require a statutory waiver before tort suits against the federal government may proceed. See 28 
U.S.C.A. § 2674 (West 2010) (providing that “[t]he United States shall be liable [in tort] . . . in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances”). 
Sovereign immunity doctrine thus constrains the application of the full panoply of tort duties 
against the government, but that is a historical contingency that might have been otherwise. See 
id. at 801–04 (discussing the common-law—not constitutional—origins of federal sovereign 
immunity); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963) (arguing that the importation of English common law doctrines of 
sovereign immunity was the result of a series of historical contingencies). In any event, the 
federal government has waived its sovereign immunity against a large swath of tort claims by 
statute. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) constitutes the government’s general waiver of 
sovereign immunity against tort actions and sets forth several exceptions according to which the 
government maintains its immunity. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674, § 2680(a)–(c), (h)–(n) (listing 
exceptions to the federal government’s sovereign immunity waiver). 
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representation that the federal executive would adhere to the less 
problematic interpretation of section 4248. Deference, under these 
circumstances, seems to stand in tension with established doctrines of 
statutory interpretation and administrative law. 
After determining that internal limits based on the text of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, properly construed, did not preclude 
section 4248’s enactment, the Court examined whether the statute 
nevertheless violated external federalism constraints by encroaching 
too much on state power.48 Traditionally, state governments controlled 
the civil commitment of the mentally ill under the sort of general 
police or parens patriae powers49 that the federal government may not 
exercise.50 In Comstock, the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
both concluded that section 4248 contravened federalism constraints 
by enabling federal usurpation of these traditional state powers 
because the statute “provide[d] for the commitment of a person after 
a person has completed a sentence for a federal crime, i.e., when the 
power to prosecute federal offenses is exhausted[.]”51 The termination 
of federal prosecutory power, in principle, should cause police or 
parens patriae authority over a former federal prisoner to revert to 
the state government. The statutory text does make it clear that 
potential committed persons must be “in the custody of the Bureau of 
Prisons,” but it also provides that if federal officials “certify that the 
person is a sexually dangerous person,” that certification “shall stay 
the release of the person pending completion of [commitment] 
procedures . . . . ”52 The Court of Appeals emphasized that, “[i]n the 
cases at issue here, this stay has extended federal confinement well 
past the end of any prison term.”53 For example, the Attorney General 
certified Comstock as sexually dangerous six days before the end of a 
 
 48. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962–65 (2010) (discussing external federalism restrictions 
on national power). 
 49. See United States v. Sahhar, 56 F.3d 1026, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting the “truism 
that . . . the general field of lunacy . . . is reserved to the states”) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (“The Constitution . . . 
withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type 
of legislation.”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (discussing authorities 
that forbid Congress to exercise a police power). 
 51. See United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 281–82 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United 
States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 551 (E.D.N.C. 2007)). 
 52. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(a) (West 2010). 
 53. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 277 (emphasizing that “pursuant to § 4248, the federal 
government has civilly confined former federal prisoners without proof that they have 
committed any new offense”). 
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thirty-seven month sentence, staying his release for the three-plus 
years required for the Supreme Court’s decision to issue.54 
More important, the statute may be construed to authorize the 
federal government to initially commit individuals after their federal 
prison and supervised release terms have ended. The initial “sexual 
dangerousness” certification stays release for the duration of 
commitment proceedings. If those proceedings take enough time, they 
could conclude, and the order of commitment could be issued, after 
the date on which federal imprisonment and supervised release 
originally would have ended. This possibility—that section 4248 might 
be read to permit a federal civil commitment action to be taken 
“when the [federal] power to prosecute federal offenses is exhausted” 
and when, in principle, authority should revert to the state 
government—is the usurpation that the courts below seem to have 
been most worried about.55 Read this way, section 4248 appears to 
delegate to the Attorney General and federal Bureau of Prisons a 
portion of “general ‘police power, which the Founders denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States’.”56 
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that section 4248 
impermissibly invades state authority on two grounds. First, the 
majority reasoned that a special relationship arises between the 
federal government and its inmates when it places them in federal 
custody, which relationship imposes responsibilities on the federal 
government to prevent its prisoners from harming others. In the light 
of the support the federal penal system provides for Congress’s 
 
 54. See id. (describing the timing of the Attorney General’s certification). If no state 
government agrees to take charge of the subject of commitment proceedings under section 4248, 
the detainee may be federally committed until either a state assumes responsibility for the 
detainee or the director of the federal facility certifies that the detainee “will not be sexually 
dangerous to others if released unconditionally,” or “under a prescribed regimen of medical, 
psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(d)–(e) (West 2010). No 
provision of the statute requires that commitment be terminated on the date that the detainee’s 
federal prison sentence and supervised release period would have ended but-for the 
commitment. Accordingly, interpreting section 4248 to allow commitment to extend indefinitely 
“after a person has completed a sentence for a federal crime” is plausible on the statute’s plain 
language. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 281 (quoting Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 551) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the District Court, Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court all 
accepted this construction of the statute. See id. (Fourth Circuit, quoting District Court); 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1961 (acknowledging that the operation of section 4248 may “detain[ ] 
[federal prisoners] beyond the termination of their criminal sentence”). 
 55. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 281. 
 56. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1964 (2010) (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 
618). 
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enumerated powers, the argument runs, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause should be construed to authorize the government to discharge 
its custodial responsibilities even if that means exercising continuing 
dominion over individuals after formal federal prosecutorial power is 
exhausted.57 Second, and more important for present purposes, the 
Court emphasized that “the Solicitor General repeatedly confirmed at 
oral argument [that] section 4248 is narrow in scope” by arguing, 
among other things, “that ‘the Federal Government would not have . . . 
the power to commit a person who . . . has been released from prison 
and whose period of supervised release is also completed’.”58 
Then-Solicitor General Kagan’s reading of the statute avoids the 
federalism-based preclusion of federal usurpation of state parens 
patriae powers.59 But Kagan’s interpretation is not the only plausible 
reading of the statutory language. Kagan read the statute to limit 
commitment proceedings in a way that Congress declined, expressly, 
to do itself—section 4248 does not include a clear prohibition against 
initiating civil commitment after the period of federal custody has 
ended; indeed, the plain language of the statute appears to permit it.60 
A familiar canon of administrative statutory interpretation is that an 
unconstitutional delegation of authority cannot be “cured” by a 
narrowing interpretation issued by the agency on which the statute 
confers implementing authority.61 The rule is supported by common 
sense: The Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons are 
Congress’s designated administrators of the federal civil commitment 
system. They may adhere to the Solicitor’s assurance, at oral 
argument, that the federal executive will not commit individuals after 
their term of imprisonment and supervised release has expired.62 But 
the statute’s plain language does not require adherence to that 
limitation, and future administrations may take different approaches. 
 
 57. See id. at 1961 (discussing the federal government’s role as custodian of its prisoners). 
 58. Id. at 1964–65 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 08–1224) (emphasis added). 
 59. See Brief for the United States at 43–44, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 08-
1224) (arguing that section 4248 is consistent with traditional state parens patriae powers 
because its scope is limited to a subset of persons already in federal custody). 
 60. See Brief for the United States, supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (describing 
“[t]he idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by 
declining to exercise some of that power [as] internally contradictory”). 
 62. See Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 38 (arguing that the conditions of 
supervised release allow for limitations on the freedom of the individual that could not 
otherwise be imposed). 
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Deference to the executive here—which surely seems to be what the 
Comstock Court granted, at least on this point—runs contrary to this 
intuitively appealing canon of administrative law and is, therefore, 
puzzling. 
Why did the Court simply accept the government’s guarantee that 
it would not enforce section 4248 in the manner that raised federalism 
concerns?63 Perhaps the “special relationship” factor—and the related 
idea that section 4248’s reach is limited strictly to the group of current 
or former federal prisoners—was sufficient on its own to assuage 
federalism concerns for the Court.64 Perhaps the Court concluded, sub 
silento, that greater deference is owed the executive in penal matters 
than in other contexts. Such a rule also appeals to common sense: the 
executive has relatively more experience and expertise than Congress 
or the courts in managing the federal penal system. This sort of 
comparative institutional competence observation is a familiar 
justification for deference, but federal agencies’ documented tendency 
to engage in turf-building supports the rule against deference to 
agencies’ interpretations of the statutory provisions that define their 
jurisdiction.65 These factors and others should be considered to assess 
the propriety of deference, but no such discussion appears in 
Comstock. If the Comstock Court in fact adopted a new deference 
rule, then it is insufficiently explained and justified thus far. 
 
 63. The Supreme Court appears to have deferred to the Solicitor General’s interpretation 
of another ambiguous part of the language of section 4248: the “state custody” provision. See 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962–63 (discussing the Solicitor’s construction, proposed at oral 
argument, of 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(d) (West 2010). The statutory language leaves it unclear 
whether states that agree to take custody of “sexually dangerous” former federal prisoners may 
elect not to civilly commit them under state law. Id. at 1962. The respondents argued that the 
statute violates federalism norms by empowering the federal government to require 
commitment by states that assume custody of individuals deemed “sexually dangerous” by the 
Attorney General, rendering states “powerless to prevent the detention of their citizens under § 
4248 even if detention is contrary to the State’s policy choices.” Id. at 1962–63 (quoting Brief for 
Respondents at 11, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 08-1224)). The Court 
accepted, as a sufficient response to the objection, the Solicitor General’s statement at oral 
argument “that the Federal Government would have no appropriate role with respect to an 
individual covered by the statute once ‘the transfer to State responsibility and State control has 
occurred’.” Id. at 1963 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (No. 08–1224). 
 64. Recall that the Court disclaimed the idea that any one of its five factors is dispositive of 
constitutionality. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 65. See Garrick B. Pursley, Avoiding Deference Questions, 44 TULSA L. REV. 557, 560 
(2009) (discussing these and other factors relevant to the desirability of deference) (citing 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1455 
n.56 (2008) on the “turf-building” factor and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 
DUKE L.J. 549, 614–17 (2009) on the comparative institutional capacity factor). 
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Aside from the comparative institutional capacity consideration, 
the Comstock Court’s approach also may draw justification from 
another familiar canon of statutory interpretation—the rule that 
where two interpretations of a statute are plausible—one that raises 
constitutional doubts and a “saving” interpretation that avoids 
them—the saving interpretation should be adopted.66 Leave aside 
momentarily the observation that the Comstock Court seems to have 
reached its conclusion about the statute’s meaning on this point by 
deferring to the executive’s interpretation. All else equal, if allowing 
commitment to commence after the completion of imprisonment and 
supervised release periods raises federalism concerns, then construing 
section 4248 not to permit post-custodial commitment actions would 
be legitimate constitutional avoidance. 
Now allow deference to reenter the discussion. The avoidance 
canon traditionally has been a rule of judicial statutory 
interpretation,67 and the Court did not actually parse the text of 
section 4248 on this point. It apparently deferred to the executive’s 
parsing. That deference, under these circumstances, may be justified if 
it allows the Court to avoid resolving constitutional doubts. That is, it 
is not obvious that the saving interpretation must be derived 
independently by a court for the avoidance canon to legitimately 
factor in the resolution of a challenge to the statute. Perhaps the 
saving interpretation may be generated by an agency. But that 
permutation of the avoidance canon has never been explicitly 
embraced by the Court and an assessment of the legitimacy of such a 
hybrid avoidancedeference rule requires substantially more analysis 
than I can provide in this limited space. But it is troubling that the 
Comstock Court’s chosen method for avoiding the federalism 
objections to section 4248 seems to raise a different constitutional 
doubt about the legitimacy of deference to agency interpretations that 
“cure” otherwise constitutionally deficient statutes. The Court might 
have avoided the problem by interpreting section 4248, independently, 
to be as narrow as or narrower than the Solicitor’s proffered 
interpretation at oral argument. But it didn’t. The Court’s strange 
 
 66. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1575 (2000) (describing the principle that 
“statutes should be construed in such a way as to avoid constitutional difficulties”); Pursley,  
supra note 65, at 566–67 (canvassing avoidance doctrines). 
 67. See Young, supra note 66, at 1574–78 (discussing the avoidance canon and its 
application). 
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handling of the federalism consequences of construing section 4248 to 
permit post-custodial initiation of commitment proceedings is another 
of Comstock’s oddities. 
CONCLUSION 
I have highlighted the Comstock Court’s account of the history of 
federal civil commitment legislation as a strange twist on traditional 
portrayals of “constitutional dialogue” between Congress and courts; 
the Court’s discussion of the common law duties of custodians as an 
interesting theoretical foray into the deep connections between 
constitutional law and the law of torts; and the Court’s acceptance of 
the Solicitor General’s oral argument guarantees that the federal 
government will implement section 4248 in a manner that does not 
overly invade state government authority as a potentially problematic 
new form of deference that is both under-explained and apparently 
inconsistent with established deference rules and their justifications. 
These interesting analytic features make the Comstock opinion one of 
the most curious to be issued in recent years. Their practical 
implications remain to be seen, of course—future courts’ views about 
the meaning and scope of the Comstock holding will, ultimately, tell 
the tale. 
By focusing on some of the opinion’s side issues, however, I do not 
mean to downplay the importance of Comstock’s holding about the 
scope of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Despite efforts to downplay the impact of its conclusion, the Court 
dispelled the contestable yet persistent view that the Clause permits 
actions only one-step removed from the exercise of an enumerated 
power.68 While the respondents, some amici, and Justices Thomas and 
Scalia appear to still believe that this is the best reading of Article I, 
section 8, theirs is now clearly a dissenting view.69 
As do most important Supreme Court decisions, Comstock leaves 
some questions open. The majority did not provide a readily 
generalizable limitation on Congress’s power to legislate in 
furtherance of implied powers. The meaning of the five-factor test 
 
 68. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963. 
 69. E.g., Consolidated Brief for the Cato Institute and Prof. Randy E. Barnett as Amici 
Curiae In Support of Respondents at 20–21, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) 
(No. 08-1224); Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1976–77 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/4/2010  11:54:31 AM 
2010] PENAL DEFERENCE AND OTHER ODDITIES 113 
remains to be worked out.70 And Comstock’s long-term impact is 
difficult to predict. Some commentators argue that Comstock’s subtle 
revamping of the judicial approach to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause has significant implications for the survival of federal health 
care legislation.71 Lawsuits have been initiated to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;72 
the Act’s individual mandate provisions—requiring individuals to 
either purchase health insurance or pay fines—may have to be 
justified as an exercise of Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause 
authority.73 As one commentator notes, “[t]he government has already 
cited Comstock in arguing that the ‘individual mandate’ created by 
the plan is constitutional.”74 Others view the decision as evidence that 
the Supreme Court’s views on the scope of national power tend to 
shift with the political winds.75 
 
 70. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 71. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 18, at 260–68 (discussing the implications of Comstock for 
pending litigation on the constitutionality of the individual mandate provisions of the federal 
healthcare legislation); Robert Schapiro, Return of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Just in 
Time for Health Care), CONCURRING OPINIONS (May 27, 2010, 3:43 PM), http:// 
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/05/return-of-the-necessary-and-proper-clause-just-
in-time-for-health-care.html (addressing how a broad view of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
justifies the exercise of federal authority to guarantee universal healthcare). 
 72. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
See Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla., 
June 16, 2010), docket available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/florida/flndce/ 
3:2010cv00091/57507/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2010); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-
cv-00188-HEH (E.D. Va., May 24, 2010), docket available at http://docs.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/district-courts/virginia/vaedce/ 3:2010cv00188/252045/78/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
 73. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 18, at 261; Michael Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Decision 
about Sexually Dangerous Federal Prisoners: Could It Hold the Key to the Constitutionality of 
the Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance?, FINDLAW, May 19, 2010, http:// 
writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100519.html; Schapiro, supra note 71. 
 74. See Somin, supra note 18, at 261 (citing government motions to dismiss filed in both the 
Florida and Virginia lawsuits). 
 75. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Comstock’s Folly, PRAWFSBLAWG, (May 18, 2010, 
10:21 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/05/comstocks-folly.html (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s deferential review of laws that are not necessary, but are passed by 
legislators who operate under political incentives). See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL 
OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court has tended to 
reach results consistent with public opinion); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES 
JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (discussing judicial decision making under the influence of other 
institutions and actors). The alignment of the Justices’ votes in Comstock is an intriguing datum 
for students of the attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking—that is, the view that “justices 
make decisions by considering the facts of the case in light of their ideological attitudes and 
values,” JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 110 (2002). This is particularly evident in Chief Justice 
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The category of arguments Comstock ratifies—predicating 
implied congressional powers on other implied congressional 
powers—seems destined to collide with the Court’s caution in United 
States v. Lopez that one may not “pile inference upon inference” to 
find a constitutional basis for congressional action.76 The result of that 
collision—whether the Court begins to systematically affirm 
Congress’s exercises of implied powers predicated on other implied 
powers or, instead, reinvigorates formalistic, judicially-enforceable, 
Lopez-like limitations on congressional authority—will go a long way 
toward marking Comstock’s true significance. 
 
 
Roberts’s decision to join Justices Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor in the majority. 
See Somin, supra note 18, at 266–67 (noting the Chief Justice Roberts’s vote). 
 76. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
